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THE INACCESSIBLE ROAD TO MOTHERHOOD -
THE TRAGIC CONSEQUENCE OF NOT HAVING




The desire of an individual to become a parent can be very strong, especially in
"child-centric" societies, where the idea of having children and raising a family is highly
valued. In those societies, the prominent pro-natal nature translates into policies and laws
regulating reproduction. The Jewish-Israeli society is a prime example of such a society
where the use of state-funded Assisted Reproduction Technologies ("ARTs") is the highest
in the world-eight times higher than the international average.1
However, the road to becoming a parent is not as smooth for all members of Israeli
society. A recent case that went all the way to the Israeli Supreme Court proved how the
current Israeli reproductive policies, particularly surrounding third-party reproduction
methods such as adoption or surrogacy, are inaccessible to people with disabilities (among
other minority groups) who share the same great desire to become parents.2
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representation in the incredible case that stands at the heart of this piece, and later to the writing of it. I am
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Roni Rothler from the Disability Rights Clinic at Bar Ilan University's faculty of law, and want to thank them
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1 Sigal Gooldin, Emotional Rights, Moral Reasoning, and Jewish-Arab Alliances in the Regulation of In-
vitro-fertilization in Israel: Theorizing the Unexpected Consequences ofAssisted Reproductive Technologies,
83 Soc. Sci. & MED. 90, 90-91 (2013).
2 For a description and citations of the courts' decisions on the OraMor Yosefcase, see infra notes 143-153
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The Ora Mor Yosef case revolves around a Jewish-Israeli woman with muscular
dystrophy who could not bear a child because of her impairment. Her dream of becoming a
mother was so powerful that after exhausting all of her other options, she used a surrogate,
sperm donation, and egg donation to bring a baby into the world. However, the lack of
genetic-biological connection to the baby led the courts to decide not to recognize Ora as
the mother, meaning that she never had the chance to even see the baby.
This Article will examine the exceptional case of Ora Mor Yosefin a broad context and
from a "Disability Legal Studies" perspective. It will compare Israeli socio-legal treatment
of what I refer to as the right to become a parent with the United States legal system and
will show how Israeli law makes it more difficult for women with disabilities to have
children. It will continue with a discussion on the concept of disabled motherhood from
a comparative Israeli-American perspective. This discussion will illuminate that there are
still universal struggles and hardships for people with disabilities, specifically women, as
they endeavor to become mothers and in raising their children. By using a Disability Legal
Studies framework and a socio-legal analysis, this interdisciplinary Article will bring to
the foreground issues and ramifications that were not found in the original reasoning of the
Israeli courts' rulings on the Ora Mor Yosef case and will demonstrate the crucial role legal
institutions play in the social construction of disability and its treatment by society. It is my
hope that this paper will therefore help bring more attention to the issue of disabled parents
and prevent tragic instances like the one standing in the heart of this paper from recurring.
It is important to conduct a comparative analysis of the American and Israeli legal
systems on this issue since the Israeli legal treatment of people with disabilities has been
influenced by American disability rights academia, legislation, and activism. The Americans
with Disabilities Act ("ADA") was used as the model for the Equal Rights for People
with Disabilities Law, which is the main Israeli legislation governing this population, and
American legal scholars were even involved in its enactment.3 Furthermore, the work of
Bizchut-the Human Rights Center for People with Disabilities, the leading organization
on promoting the rights of Israelis with disabilities-was influenced by the work of
and accompanying text. For the expressed desire of women with disabilities to become mothers, see infra
note 141.
3 Stanley S. Herr, Reforming Disability Nondiscrimination Laws: A Comparative Perspective, 35 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 305, 309 (2002); Stanley S. Herr, The International Significance of Disability Rights, 93
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 101ST ASN. MEETING (AM. Soc'Y OF INT'L L.) 332, 333 (1999); Arie Rimmerman, Michal
Soffer, Dana David, Tsilly Dagan, Roni Rothler & Lior Mishaly, Mapping the Terrain ofDisability Legislation:
The Case of Israel, 30 DISABImITY & Soc'y 46, 48 (2015); Neta Ziv, Disability Law in Israel and the United
States -A Comparative Perspective, 28 ISR. YB. Hum. RTS. 171, 172-73 (1998).
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American civil rights organizations.4 The two systems differ, however, as Israel has signed
and ratified5 the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities ("UN
CRPD"),6 while the United States has declined to do so. This is the first time that such a
comparative analysis has been conducted on the issue of parents living with disabilities,
and it helps shed light on the broader relationship between disability and law.
Part I introduces the socio-legal landscape regarding access to reproduction in Israel
and the United States. In Part II, I provide an overview of the stigmas and legal treatment
of disabled mothers in both legal systems. Part III will describe the OraMor Yosef case and
the Israeli courts' rulings on the matter. Finally, in Part IV, I will provide an analysis and
critique of the court rulings using a Disability Legal Studies approach.
I. A Comparative Socio-Legal Analysis of the Right to Become a Parent
A. What is the Right to Become a Parent?
Development in ARTs, beginning in the early 1980s, has sparked a debate around the
issue of who should be allowed to gain access to such technology.8 The debate has developed
from revolving solely around the use of technology to focusing on a much broader question
of who should have the ability to have and raise children and on whether the state should
regulate parenting in the same way it regulates and licenses "other potentially harmful
activities." 9 This debate about who should get the right to become a parent continues to
4 Hila Rimon-Greenspan, Disability Politics in Israel: Civil Society, Advocacy, and Contentious Politics,
27 DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2007), available at http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/47/47 [http://perma.cc/6YJJ-T33J];
Ziv, supra note 3, at 172-73.
5 Israel first signed the UN CRPD and became a formal state party on March 30, 2007 and ratified it on
September 28, 2012. See United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, Dec. 13, 2006,
2515 U.N.T.S. 3, available at https://treaties.un.org/PagesNiewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg no=iv-
15&chapter=4&lang=en [http://perna.cc/Q7LD-ALGB] [hereinafter UN CRPD].
6 UN CRPD, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3.
7 ARIE RIMMERMAN, FAMILY POLICY AND DISABILITY 185-86 (2015); Tracy R. Justesen & Troy R. Justesen,
An Analysis of the Development and Adoption of the United Nations Convention Recognizing the Rights of
Individuals With Disabilities: Why the United States Refuses to Sign this UN Convention, 14 HUM. RTs. BRIEF.
36, 39-40 (2007).
8 ERIN NELSON, LAW, POLICY AND REPRODUCTIVE ANATOMY 273 (2014).
9 MUKTI JAIN CAMPION, WHO'S FIT TO BE A PARENT? 5 (1995); Hugh LaFollette, Licensing Parents, 2 PHiL.
& PUB. AFF. 182, 184-86 (1980).
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this day and usually focuses on historically underserved minority groups. This Article
focuses on parenting for people with disabilities and even more specifically on mothers
with disabilities.
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution has protected a person's
right to procreate without having the state interfere or prevent her from doing so. 10 In
Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Supreme Court specifically drew a right to procreate from a
person's right to privacy when it stated that if "the right of privacy means anything it is the
right of the individual, married or not, to be free from government intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child."11 Years
later, in Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme Court has also recognized procreation as a "major
life activity," while determining HIV infection to be a disability according to the ADA. 12
Nevertheless, and as implied, the right for privacy can only serve as the base for a narrow
negative right to procreate. 13
Scholars have named various rationales that lie behind the desire to procreate, in turn
basing it on such noble ideas as human dignity, individual meaning of life, and identity. 14
Other values put forward include: the desire to achieve immortality by continuing to live
through one's decedents; the desire to live vicariously through the child in a way and
thus ensure a "second chance in life"; the desire to ensure that the family name will be
carried on; and the longing to create a secure nest and achieve a deep and meaningful
connection and relationship with their flesh and blood extension of self. 15 Those values and
10 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978); Moore v.
City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977).
11 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); ROLAND DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING
OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 101-02 (1996).
12 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639-41 (1998). For further analysis of the decision, see Carl H.
Coleman, Conceiving Harm: Disability Discrimination in Reproductive Technologies, 50 UCLA L. REv. 17,
33-36 (2002).
13 DWORKIN, supra note 11, at 101-10; Daniel Statman, The Right For Parenthood: An Argument for a
Narrow Interpretation, 10 ETHICAL PERSP. 224, 225-26 (2003).
14 JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 16 (1994);
Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible Harms, 23 BERKELEY J.
GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 49 (2008); Nicolette Priaulx, Rethinking Progenitive Conflict: Why Reproductive
Autonomy Matters, 16 MED. L. REv. 169, 175 (2008).
15 Carter Dillard, Valuing Having Children, 12 J.L. & FAN. STUD. 151, 171-98 (2010); Statman, supra note
13, at 226.
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rationales have led to a broader, positive right, and this right requires the state to assist people
to become parents.
It is important to clarify that the interest behind the right to procreate is not merely the
idea of replicating one's genes. Although the idea of procreation for itself might appeal to
some people more than to others, it should be safe to say that the primary interest behind
the right to procreate is the desire to rear children and develop a meaningful relationship
with them (an interest that can be satisfied even if the genetic connection is nonexistent).
Therefore, the right to procreate can usually be framed as the right to become a parent or the
right to parenthood. 16 This notion is reinforced by the United Nations Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, which recognizes the right to found a family as a basic human right. 17
With regard to persons with disabilities, Article 23 of the UN CRPD requires party states to
"take effective and appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against persons with
disabilities in all matters relating to ... parenthood."18 As such, for the rest of this paper,
the right to procreate will be framed as the right to become a parent.
B. The Desire to Become a Parent-A Socio-Cultural Perspective
A person's desire to become a parent has historically existed in most settings, cultures,
and contexts. Nevertheless, as in the case of other social norms, this desire does not seem
to manifest itself to the same extent within different groups and societies.
In 2014 the Danish government funded the "Do It for Denmark!" campaign aimed at
boosting the country's low birthrate by convincing Danes to go on a holiday, since people
are believed to have more sex when on vacation. 19 While it seems that a significant number
of the people of Denmark do not seem to want to have any or many children, on the other
16 Statman, supra note 13, at 225.
17 Article 16, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(JJ)
(Dec. 10, 1948).
18 UN CRPD, Dec. 13, 2006, 2515 U.N.T.S. 3; Lindsey Coffey, A Rights-Based Claim to Surrogacy: Article
23 of the Convention on the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities, 20 MICH. ST. INTL L. REV. 259, 267 (2012).
19 Michael Booth, Sun, Sex and a Baby: The Unusual Package Holiday for Danes, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/shortcuts/2014/mar/30/sun-sex-baby-package-holiday-danes-
denmark [http://permna.cc/A9D8-WHK7]; Terrence McCoy, 'Do It for Denmark!' Campaign Wants Danes
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side of the spectrum are other societies that are much more "child-centric," and Israel is
one of them.
Research has shown that the Jewish-Israeli society is very family-oriented, with high
marriage rates, relatively low divorce rates, and high birth rates.2 0 The reasons for those
pro-natal tendencies are said to include: biblical-religious perceptions; identification with
the collective goal of fighting the "demographic threat" (i.e., the fear that the country's
Arab population might eventually outnumber the Jews); the aspiration to bring up more
Jewish babies especially in the wake of the Holocaust; and the fear of losing a child in war
or terrorist attack (as part of the mandatory army service).2 1 For minority groups in Israel,
such as the LGBTQ community, the "ticket into society" is to have a baby.22 It is therefore
not surprising that the theme of the 2014 annual gay pride week in Tel Aviv was "Proud
Families," with the main parade not ending at the traditional party on the beach, but at a
nearby park where new gay parents could easily push their strollers and play with their
children on the playground. 3
With regard to the United States, according to a 2013 Gallup survey, most Americans
have a desire to have children, and that attitude has remained unchanged over the past
two decades. More than nine in ten adults say they already have children, are planning to
have children, or wish that they had had children. The five percent of American adults who
20 Daphna Birenbaum-Carmeli & Yoram S. Carneli, Reproductive Technologies Among Jewish-Israelis:
Setting the Ground, in KIN, GENE, COMMUNITY: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AMONG JEWISH ISRAELIS 1, 4-6
(Daphna Birenbaum-Carneli & Yoram S. Caneli eds., 2010); Yacl Hahiloni-Dolev, Between Mothers, Fetuses
and Society: Reproductive Genetics in the Israeli-Jewish Context, 12 NASHIM: J. JEWISH WOMEN'S STUD. &
GENDER 129, 130 (2006).
21 SUSAN MARTHA KAHN, REPRODUCING JEWS: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION IN ISRAEL 3-4
(2000); Birenbaum-Canneli & Canneli, supra note 20, at 6-8; Gooldin, supra note 1, at 91; Hahiloni-Dolev,
supra note 20, at 130.
22 Unlike in the United States, the fight for marriage equality in Israel, a country that does not separate
between state and religion, has not been considered the "holy grail." This is because the fight for marriage
equality is folded into a larger battle against religious control of the state institutions and family courts, which
extends far beyond the gay agenda. As one observer noted: "for gay Israelis it's not about the ring"; their real
desire is to have the right and ability to have children. See Zvika Krieger, ForgetMarriage Equality; Israeli Gays
Want Surrogacy Rights, ATLANTIC (Apr. 4, 2013), http://www.theatlantic.com/intemational/archive/2013/04/
forget-marriage-equality-israeli-gays-want-surrogacy-rights/274639/ [http://perna.cc/NCE5-K4C8].
23 Danna Harman, Gay in Israel 2014: It aFamilyAffair, HAARETZ (June 10,2014),http://www.haaretz.com/
travel-in-israel/gay-tel-aviv/tel-aviv-pride/1.597566 [http ://penna.cc/H9ZK-JHGS].
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do not want children has not changed much from the four percent found in 1990.24 Still,
Jewish-Israelis are more family-oriented and have more children (2.75 on average) than
their United States (2.7 on average) and West European (1.47 on average) counterparts. 25
Sociocultural norms tend to be translated into legal frameworks and policies, 26
specifically in the field of family law, which has gone through a process of increased
intervention by the government in recent decades.27 Policies regarding reproduction
and creation of family also work the other way: they influence people's perceptions and
understanding of the "rights and wrongs" on this highly sensitive issue.28
C. Reproductive Policies in Israel
One can expect child-centric societies to enact laws that will support a positive right
to become a parent. This hypothesis seems to be somewhat correct when it comes to the
Israeli example. ART policy in Israel is regarded as exceptional in international terms:
fertility treatments are funded by the state (for the first two live births per family) and
are offered to women of all family statuses and sexual orientations up to the age of forty-
five to fifty-one depending on whether or not a donor egg is needed.29 Israel was found
to have the world's highest number of In Vitro Fertilization ("IVF") treatment cycles per
capita.30 Israel also protects the right of a woman or a man to be absent from work for
fertility treatments and prohibits employers from firing any employee who undergoes such
24 Frank Newport & Joy Wilke, Desire for Children Still Norm in the US, GALLUP (Sept. 25, 2013),
http://www.gallup.com/poll/164618/desire-children-norm. aspx [http ://perma.cc/HXM6-7GPN].
25 Birenbaum-Carmeli & Carneli, supra note 20, at 4.
26 Stewart Macaulay, Lawrence M. Friedman & Elizabeth Mertz, The Impact of Society on Law, in LAW IN
ACTION 190-91 (Stewart Macaulay, Lawrence M. Friedman & Elizabeth Mertz eds., 2007).
27 ERIC A. POSNER, LAW & SOCIAL NORMS 68 (2000).
28 Daphna Birenbaum-Carneli & Yoram S. Carneli, Adoption andAssisted Reproduction Technologies: A
Comparative Reading ofIsraeli Policies, in KIN, GENE, COMMUNITY: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES AMONG JEWISH
ISRAELIS, supra note 20, at 127 [hereinafter Birenbaum-Carmeli & Carneli, Adoption andARI].
29 Id. at 129; Gooldin, supra note 1, at 91.
30 John A. Collins, An International Survey of the Health Economics of IVF and ICSI, 8 HUM. REPROD.
UPDATE 265, 267 (2002); Ruth Halperin-Kaddari, Redefining Parenthood, 29 CAL. W. INT'L L.J 313, 315 (1999);
Carmel Shalev & Sigal Gooldin, The Uses and Misuses of In-Vitro Fertilization in Israel: Some Sociological
and Ethical Considerations, 12 NASHIM: J. JEWISH WOMEN'S STUD. & GENDER 151, 154 (2006).
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procedures.31 However, when it comes to methods of having children without the woman
carrying them in her womb, i.e., through adoption or surrogacy (whether with a gestational
carrier or a "classic surrogate"),32 the policies are much more restricted. The cross-cultural
rationale for the stricter rules regarding those methods of third-party reproduction is that
they are considered to be more susceptive to misuse and ethical concerns regarding the
third-party.33 A second, more local rationale for the sharp distinction between the ART
and the third-party reproduction policies in Israel has to do with ensuring the religious-
ideological-political idea of the natural Jewish family. Making sure that offspring are of
common origin as the other Jewish collective is a disclosed interest of the Jewish state,
which can only be guaranteed through ART and not third-party reproduction.34
Adoption in Israel is an excruciating process that entails much bureaucratic hassle and
extensive waiting periods.35 Domestic adoption is only available to those who fulfill strict
conditions. Only heterosexual couples who are legally married (meaning married through
31 Women's LaborAct 5714-1954, 160 LSI 154 § 7(C)(4), 9(E) (1954) (Isr.).
32 A gestational carrier has a fertilized egg implanted in her uterus and thus does not hold any genetic
connection to the baby, while in the older form of surrogacy, introduced in the 1980s, a woman was inseminated
with sperm of the man who was not her partner in order to conceive the baby (with her egg), carry it and then
give it to the man and his partner to rear. Today most couples use a gestational carrier. See Adrienne Asch &
David Wasserman, Reproductive Technology, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ETHICS 4547, 4548 (Hugh
LaFollette ed., 2013). For convenience reasons, I would use the term "surrogacy" as an umbrella term for both
methods.
33 Id. at 4551.
34 Birenbaum-Carmeli & Carneli, Adoption andART, supra note 28, at 139-40.
35 Birenbaum-Carmeli & Carneli, Adoption and ART, supra note 28, at 132. Adrienne Asch has argued
against recognition of the right to parenthood as a social or political right, suggesting that parents who use
any type of third-party reproduction method should have an obligation towards the third-party and their child
allowing them to know about each other:
Accepting this responsibility and the relationship-based understanding of parenting
should lead professionals not so much to refuse access to ARTs or to adoption but rather
to challenge the adults who seek their aid to ask themselves hard questions about whether
they are up to the task of identifying with and responding to the needs of the child they are
bringing into their lives .... Those parents must be willing to disclose their child's origin
to her in age appropriate ways, and to give her any information they have about the identity
and medical history of the (other) biological contributors to her existence . . . .Gate-
keeping should focus on ensuing that prospective parents are ready for that responsibility.
Adrienne Asch, Licensing Parents: Regulating Assisted Reproduction, in FAMILIEs-BEYOND NUCLEAR IDEAL
123, 130, 132 (Daniela Cutas & Sarah Chan eds., 2012).
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the rabbinical courts) for three years, who are not more than forty-three years older than
the adopted child, and have no other children are eligible to adopt. The couple should also
have at least twelve years of schooling, show that they have a regular source of income at
least within the national average income, and that they have a home where the child could
have her own room. The prospective adopting couple also needs to be of the same religion
as the child's birth family, and the couple is assessed for their spousal, familial, and social
functioning. Single individuals are only allowed to adopt children who could not be placed
with an adoptive couple. The waiting period for a domestic adoption is five to six years
on average.36
Inter-country adoption is also quite cumbersome. Foreign adoption is much less
restrictive from the prospective parents' side in comparison with domestic adoption
(applicants must only undergo a psychologist's assessment of their parenthood abilities
and comply with the adoptee's country requirements). However, Israel is very suspicious
of foreign adoption agencies, and those agencies are subject to strict investigation before
approving the adoption. It needs to be mentioned that inter-country adoption is quite
expensive and is usually equated to a person's entire annual income, meaning it is thus
beyond the reach of most couples or single persons.37
Surrogacy in Israel is likewise a strictly regulated process. It is only available to
heterosexual couples who can prove their infertility. The prospective parents and the
surrogate must all share the same religion. The surrogate must be an unmarried woman
(i.e., single, widowed, or divorced) who has a child of her own and cannot be biologically
related to either of the prospective parents. Surrogacy in Israel is also illegal as a career.38
Despite being a highly contentious issue,39 "reproductive tourism" involving surrogacy
36 Birenbaum-Carmeli & Carneli, Adoption andART, supra note 28, at 132-33. It should be noted that the
adoption of a baby or an older child with disabilities or a health issue (such as drug addiction problem) would
require a shorter waiting time, usually two years.
37 Birenbaum-Carmeli & Carneli, Adoption andART, supra note 28, at 134.
38 Rhona Schuz, Surrogacy in Israel: An Analysis of the Law in Practice, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD:
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVEs 35, 38-42 (Rachel Cook, Shelly Day Sclater & Felicity Kaganas eds., 2003);
Irit Rosenblum, Surrogacy in Israel, NEW FAMiLY OFFICIAL WEBSITE (2014), http://www.newfamily.org.il/en/
surrogacy-in-israel [http://perna.cc/8 SXJ-VFQU].
39 For a review of the feminist critique of surrogacy, see, e.g., Melissa Lane, Ethical Issues
in Surrogacy Arrangements, in SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 38, at 121, 126-28; Katherine B. Lieber, Selling the Womb: Can the Feminist Critique
of Surrogacy Can be Answered?, 68 IND. L.J. 205, 211-17 (1992); Hiing a Woman for Her
Womb, N.Y TIMEs OPINION PAGES, ROOM FOR DEBATE (Sept. 22, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/
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abroad (especially in third world countries),4" is quite popular in Israel due to the high
demand. Many gay and straight couples turn to that option; they find a surrogate outside
the country to be inseminated with a fertilized egg (containing the genetic materials of one
or both prospective parents) and carry the baby. Once the baby is born, the parents bring
her back to their home country.41 This option requires not only a tremendous investment
of time, money, and other resources, but it is also dependent on fast-changing policies of
the foreign country,42 and on a highly bureaucratic process of bringing the child back and
determining her religion and citizenship status by proving the genetic connection to at least
one of the parents.43
While the disparity between ART and the third-party reproduction methods of adoption
and surrogacy in Israel might be justified, it obviously excludes or even discriminates
against individuals and populations who cannot bear children like infertile women, single
straight or gay men, gay couples, or people with disabilities. Specifically with regard to
people with disabilities, although the Israeli legal treatment of this population was highly
influenced by the American disability rights advocacy, academia, and legislation,44 the
Israeli counterpart for the ADA, the Equal Rights for People with Disabilities Law, was
roomfordebate/2014/09/22/hiring-a-woman-for-her-womb [http ://perna.cc/3KYU-T7CW].
For a discussion on the topic of "reproductive truism," see, e.g., Ruby L. Lee, New Trends in Global
Outsourcing of Commercial Surrogacy: A Callfor Regulation, 20 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J 275 (2009); Susan
Markens, The Global Reproductive Health Market: U.S. Media Framing and Public Discourses About
Transnational Surrogacy, 24 Soc. ScI. & MED. 1745, 1746-47 (2012); Nita Bhalla, India Surrogacy
Tourism: Exploitation or Empowerment?, THOMAS REUTERS FOUND. (Oct. 4, 2013), http://www.trust.org/
item/20131004162151-r5i0w [http://perma.cc/5KFF-FTEC]; Sophia Jones, Nepal Earthquake Shines An
Unexpected Spotlight On Gay Rights In Israel, WORLD POST (Apr. 30, 2015), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2015/04/30/nepal-earthquake-israel n 7179708.html?utm campaign=naytev&utm content=554308b3e4b02
fffe05cdl 8c&fbref=Default [http://penna.cc/4V83-TQK9].
40 Asch, supra note 35, at 125; I. Glenn Cohen, Circumvention Tourism, 97 CORNELL L. REv. 1309, 1323-25
(2012). For an extensive review of surrogacy tourism in India, see Coffey, supra note 18, at 276-83.
41 Harnan, supra note 23; Krieger, supra note 22.
42 Nilanjana Bhowmick, Why People Are Angry About India New SurrogacyRules, TIE (Feb. 15, 2013),
http://world.time.com/2013/02/15/why-people-are-angry-about-indias-new-surriogacy-laws [http://perna.cc/
9H9E-GCSD].
43 Gavriel Fiske, 65 Surrogate Babies Born to Israeli Gay Couples Stuck in Thailand, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Jan.
19, 2014), http://www.timesofisrael.com/65-surrogate-babies-born-to-israeli-gay-couples-stuck-in-thailand
[http://perma.cc/7RFX-FY6J].
44 Ziv, supra note 3, at 172-73.
30.1
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
never interpreted by the Israeli courts to include procreation as a "major life activity"
like the American Supreme Court had in Bragdon v. Abbott.45 There is currently no Israeli
legislation or significant body of case law that discusses reproductive and family policy for
people with disabilities.
D. Reproductive Policies in the United States
In the United States, state regulation of ART plays a far less crucial role than in
Israel, and more discretion is given to the medical profession. 46 Thus most fertility centers
operate without written policies about whom to treat.47 A form of gatekeeping does exist
in the form of the Ethics Committee of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine
("ASRM"). In July 2013, the ASRM Ethical Committee stated that fertility clinics may
choose their clients as long as they do not discriminate on the basis of disability or other
impermissible factors such as race, religion, ethnicity, sexual orientation, or marital
status.48 It needs to be noted that ART clinics are legally forbidden to discriminate against
people with disabilities. 49 This policy exists because ART services are also considered
as public accommodations under either Title II (if the clinic is a state-run hospital) or
Title III (being a professional office of a health care provider, hospital, or other service
establishment) to the ADA." Still a major obstacle for access to ART in the United States
45 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 639-41 (1998).
46 NELSON, supra note 8, at 264; Coleman, supra note 12, at 40-41.
47 Asch, supra note 35, at 125.
48 ETHICS COMM. OF THE AM. SOC'Y FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, Child-rearing Ability and the Provision
of Fertility Services: a Committee Opinion, ASRM PAGES, 50, 52-53 (July 2013), http://www.asnn.org/
uploadedFiles/ASRM-Content/News-and-Publications/Ethics-Committee-Reports -and -Statements/
childrearing.pdf [http://perna.cc/9YJ4-UF2L]. See also ETHICS COMM. OF THE AM. Soc'Y FOR REPRODUCTrVE
MEDICINE, Access to Fertility Treatment by Gays, Lesbians, and Unmarried Persons: A Committee Opinion,
ASRM PAGES, 1524, 1526 (Dec. 2013), https://www.asrn.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM Content/News and_
Publications/Ethics Committee Reports-and Statements/fertility-gaylesunmarried.pdf [http://perna.cc/
9LKM-KXQW].
49 However, empirical research has shown that United States IVF clinics collect data on their clients,
including information on their mental health and HIV status, and refuse access to some on those bases. See
I. Glenn Cohen, Regulating Reproduction: The Problem with Best Interests, 96 MINN. L. REv. 423, 456-57
(2011); Andrea D. Gurmankin, Arthur L. Kaplan & Andrea A. Braverman, Screening Practices and Beliefs of
Assisted Reproductive Technology Programs, 83 FERTILITY & STERILITY 61, 63-64 (2005).
50 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (2012); NAT'L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ROCKING THE CRADLE: ENSURING THE RIGHTS OF
PARENTS WITH DISABILITIES AND THEIR CHILDREN 208-09 (2012) [hereinafter ROCKING THE CRADLE].
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seems to be a financial one, depending on the existence and scope of the patient's health
insurance coverage."5
With regard to paid surrogacy in the United States, laws vary widely from state to
state.52 However, generally, contractual surrogacy is allowed in the United States. Usually
the parties who maintain a genetic connection to the child will receive the greatest
legal protections by the courts and the legislature.53 The ASRM Ethical Committee has
recommended safeguards for both the gestational carrier and the prospective parent that
include reasonable economic compensation, informed consent, and medical evaluation as
well as psychological evaluations and considerations.5 4 Therefore, at least in some states,
there are no formal legal barriers preventing people with disabilities who cannot bear a
pregnancy to become parents through surrogacy.55
Adoption in the United States is regulated both on the federal level by the Adoption and
Safe Families Act ("ASFA")56 and by state law. The ASFA, which deals with adoption of
children from within the governmental child care system, requires states to find permanent
homes for children that are in foster care in a timely manner and places a timeline to
terminate parental rights of those who are found to be unfit parents.57 State law determines
51 NELSON, supra note 8, at 279-80.
52 Carla Spivack, The Law of Surrogate Motherhood in the United States, 58 AM. J. Comp. L. 97, 97 (2010).
53 Craig Dashiell, From Louise Brown to Baby M and Beyond: A Proposed Framework to Understand
Surrogacy, 65 RUTGERS L. REv. 851, 856 (2013).
54 ETHICS COMM. OF THE AM. Soc'Y FOR REPRODUCTIVE MEDICINE, Consideration of the Gestational Carrier: A
Committee Opinion, ASRM PAGES (2013), https://www.asnn.org/uploadedFiles/ASRM Content/News and-
Publications/EthicsCommittee Reports andStatements/Cosideration%20ofo20the% 20gestational% 20
carrier2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/J4UH-PBRR]. See also Coffey, supra note 18, at 283-85.
55 Interestingly, the first and most famous case involving surrogacy in the United States, the case of Baby
M, involved a couple in which the wife was concerned about the possible health implications from getting
pregnant since she was living with multiple sclerosis and thus decided to use a surrogate. See In re Baby M,
537 A.2d 1227, 1235 (N.J. 1988). For a recent story involving surrogacy for a disabled woman who cannot
bear a pregnancy in North Carolina, see Mia De Graaf, 'It Was the First Thing I Thought of When I Fell': Bride
Paralyzed at Her Bachelorette Party Reveals How She Feared She WouldNever Have Children as She Posesfor
Moving Photos with Her Surrogate Days Before Birth, DAILYMAILCOM (Apr. 10, 2015), http://www.dailymail.
co.uk/news/article-3034526/It-thing-thought-fell-Paralyzed-bride-reveals-fears-wouldn-t-able-children-
poses-moving-maternity-pictures-surrogate-days-birth.html [http ://perna.cc/6LDA-23YG].
56 Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997).
57 Katherine A. Hort, Is Twenty-Two Months Beyond the Best Interest of the Child? ASFA s Guidelines for
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access of same-sex couples and single parents to domestic adoption. Only a few states
have laws that block those groups from adopting. 8 With regard to people with disabilities,
as in the case of ART clinics, formally Article II of the ADA59 forbids discrimination of
people with disabilities by public adoption agencies. Nevertheless, because of the tacit
ranking system used by domestic adoption agencies, they are often completely precluded
from adopting or are forced to wait for indefinite periods of time for a child .60 Inter-country
adoption in the United States is governed by standards of the Hague Convention on
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, which was
ratified by the United States in 2008.61 The formal policy prohibits discrimination against
members of the LGBTQ community or disabled people (according to Article III of the
ADA), but again as described, these groups encounter difficulties stemming from biases
within the private agencies when trying to adopt, despite the law. 62
II. Disabled Mothers-Stigmas and Legal (Mis)Treatment
The right to become a parent has its limitations. In legal systems such as the United
States and Israel, it is balanced against the state's right to protect the welfare of its citizen
children from mistreatment of an unfit parent. The best interest of the child is a standard
that is materialized differently by each state and society and according to the circumstances
of each case.63 Those ethical and moral concerns have affected people with disabilities who
wanted to become parents across societies and countries. In some U.S. states, disability
may be considered as a factor when determining the best interest of the child with regard to
custody. In order to be considered as a factor, a nexus between the particularly disability at
the Termination of Parental Rights, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1879, 1880-81 (2000).
58 Gary J. Gates et al., Adoption andFoster Care by Gay andLesbian Parents in the UnitedStates, WILIMS
INST. 1, 3 (2007).
59 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
60 ROCKING THE CRADLE, supra note 50, at 18 8.
61 ROCKING THE CRADLE, supra note 50, at 185-86.
62 ROCKING THE CRADLE, supra note 50, at 186.
63 See, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 303 (1993); Ella Callow, Kelly Buckland & Shannon Jones,
Parents with Disabilities in the United States: Prevalence, Perspectives, and a Proposalfor Legislative Change
to Protect the Right to Family in the Disability Community, 17 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R. 9, 11 (2011) SANTOSKY,
SUPRA NOTE 10, AT 766.
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issue and the potential harm to the child needs to be proven.64 Ella Callow, Kelly Buckland,
and Shannon Jones argue that, although in most cases the state fails to prove such a nexus,
many children of disabled parents are removed from their homes and put in foster care. In
February 2015, the National Council on Disability, an independent federal agency advising
the White House and Congress and other federal authorities, have officially recognized
this issue to be a widespread problem and have stated that the removal of a baby from her
disabled parent can constitute disability discrimination.65
The main reasons underlying removal of children from their disabled parents in the
United States and of disabled persons' preclusion of access to third-party reproduction
methods in Israel seem to be identical-and have to do with stigmas, biases, and fear towards
people with disabilities, which is the notion underling the Social Model of Disability.66 As
will be further discussed below, women with disabilities face further stigmatizing treatment
due to the intersectionality of their gender and disability identities.
In the past few decades, a new movement that challenged the over-medicalization and
individualistic accounts of disability has risen. A cornerstone for this movement is the
64 The requirement for state services to prove a nexus between the parent's disability and child welfare has
been fleshed out in case law. See Callow et al., supra note 63, at 22; see also J.C. v. Dep't of Children & Family
Servs. (In the interest of G.C.), 6 So.3d 643, 651 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) ("In other words, we must decide
whether DCF [Department of Children and Families] demonstrated a nexus or predictive relationship between
the past domestic violence or the Mother's mental health issues and future harm to the children.").
65 Callow et al., supra note 63, at 17. Following a case in which a two-day-old baby was removed from her
nineteen-year-old mother with developmental disabilities by welfare authorities in the state of Massachusetts,
the National Council on Disability stated that, "Parents with disabilities are suffering significant discrimination
... . States are removing these children for the sole reason of their parents having a disability." Feds:
State Wrongly Took Mom Child 2 Days After Birth, N.Y TIMES (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
aponline/2015/02/07/us/ap-us-disabled-mother-baby-taken.html? r-0 [http://penna.cc/X4BY-M4DJ] (internal
quotations omitted). Unlike many others, this specific case had a happy ending-after the Department
of Justice and the Department of Health and Human Services investigated and found the state acts
to constitute a disability discrimination according to the ADA, the baby was returned to the mother
who now raises her with the help of the grandmother. Susan Donaldson James, 'We can keep her':
Disabled mom wins daughter back after legal battle, TODAY (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.today.com/
parents/disabled-mom-gets-daughter-back-after-legal-battle-2D 80545265 [http://permna.cc/NTF4-CXK7];
Elizabeth Picciuto, Baby Taken Away Because Mom 'Disabled,'DAILY BEAST (Feb. 10, 2015), http://www.
thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/02/10/baby-taken-away-because-mom-s-disabled.html [http://permna.cc/8K2E
-BYZB].
66 Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Difference: Disability and Discrimination, 44 J. Soc. ISSUES 39,
42-43 (1988).
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Social Model of Disability,67 which stands in contrast to the Medical and Individual
Models. 68 The Social Model emerged in England in the early 1970s with the Union of
Physically Impaired Against Segregation ("UPIAS"), a group of physically disabled
veterans who were inspired by the collective ideas of Marxism and rejected "mercy based"
agendas of mainstream disability organizations and since gained universal recognition.69
In short, the Social Model argues that mainstream society constructs a set of norms that
regards people with disabilities as an inferior group.70 This model focuses on challenging
society's attitude towards people with disabilities. It views disability as a phenomenon
dependent on wider social contexts (and not solely on the medical-pathological aspects)
that is created as a result of complex processes of stigmatization, myths, and impressions
regarding people with disabilities.7 I
The fear of having people with disabilities reproduce and act as parents was clearly
manifested in sterilization policies that were widespread in the United States during
the nineteenth and first half the twentieth century. In those days, American policy had
taken active measures, implemented through legislation in thirty states, aiming to prevent
the notion of disabled parenthood through involuntary sterilization of people labeled
"feebleminded," a term used to describe mostly those with mental or developmental
disabilities, but also those with sensory and physical disabilities.72 In its notorious 1927
decision Buck v. Bell, the Supreme Court upheld the Virginia statute that authorized the
sterilization of Carry Buck, an eighteen-year-old "epileptic and feebleminded" young
67 Bill Hughes & Kevin Paterson, The Social Model of Disability and the Disappearing Body: Towards a
Sociology of Impairment, 12 DISABILITY & Soc'Y 325, 325-26 (1997).
68 Jerome E. Bickenbach, Somnath Chatterji, E.M. Badley & T.B. Ustin, Models of Disablement,
Universalism and the International Classification ofImpairments, Disabilities and Handicaps, 48 Soc. Sci. &
MED. 1173, 1173-74 (1999).
69 Tom Shakespeare, The Social Model of Disability, in THE DISABILITY STUD. READER 266, 266 (Lennard
Davis ed., 2010).
70 George Wolbring, The Politics ofAbleism, 51 DEv. 252, 253 (2008).
71 SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS MOVEMENT 3 (2009);
MICHAEL OLIVER, THE POLITICS OF DISABLEMENT: A SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH 11 (1990).
72 David Pfeiffer, Eugenics and Disability Discrimination, 9 DISABILITY & Soc'Y 481, 482 (1994); Michael
G. Silver, Note, Eugenics and Compulsory Sterilization Laws: Providing Redress for the Victims of a Shameful
Era in United States History, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 862, 867 (2004).
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woman living in an institution who gave birth to a girl after being raped by a relative. 71
Those eugenic policies were justified as being in the best interest of society-preventing
"socially inadequate" populations from reproducing and having their offspring be a burden
on society because of their inability to take care of them.74
Although seven states currently still have legislation allowing sterilization of
people with disabilities, most such laws were struck down by the 1970s, and other rules
preventing sterilization have been enacted. 75 According to a 2010 survey, there are about
4.1 million parents with disabilities who have children under the age of eighteen in the
United States. 76 Nevertheless it seems that similar negative attitudes and societal biases
against the idea of people with disabilities having and rearing children prevailed and are
commonplace today.77
Those same attitudes and biases exist towards people with disabilities in general but
they seem to manifest themselves in much stronger ways when it comes to parents with
disabilities, specifically mothers. Women with disabilities fall short of conforming to any of
the socially perceived gender roles: they are socially perceived as inadequate to fulfill either
the economically productive role that is traditionally attributed to men or the nurturing,
reproductive roles traditionally reserved to women.78 As Michelle Fine and Adrienne Asch
argue, "[im]otherhood, the institution and experience that perhaps has dominated all cultural
conceptions of women-eclipsing even expectations of beauty, softness, or ever-present
sexuality-often has been proscribed for a woman with a disability. ' 79 This idea relates
to what has been noted in the literature about women with disabilities facing multiple
73 Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 205 (1927).
74 Paul A. Lombardo, Medicine, Eugenics and the Supreme Court: From Coercive Sterilization to
Reproductive Freedom, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALm L. & POL'Y 1, 3 (1996); Callow et al., supra note 63, at 14.
75 See RIMMERMAN, supra note 7, at 188-89; ROCKING THE CRADLE, supra note 50, at 43-44; Jana Leslie-
Miller, From Bell to Bell: Responsible Reproduction in the Twentieth Century, 8 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES
123, 136-37 (1997); Silver, supra note 72, at 863.
76 ROCKING THE CRADLE, supra note 50, at 49.
77 Callow et al., supra note 63, at 14.
78 RAVI MALHOTRA & MORGAN ROWE, EXPLORING DISABILITY AND DISABILITY RIGHTS THROUGH NARRATIvES:
FINDING A VOICE OF THEIR OWN 153-59 (2013); Michele Fine & Adrienne Asch, Disabled Women: Sexism
without the Pedestal, 8 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 233, 233-34 (1981).
79 MICHELE FINE & ADRIENNE ASCH, WOMEN WITH DISABILITIES: ESSAYS IN PSYCHOLOGY, CULTURE, AND POLITICS
21(1988).
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challenges arising from a double source of discriminatory attitudes. 80 Nevertheless, neither
Israel nor America legally recognizes disabled mothers as a distinct category with certain
legal rights.81
The universal stigma towards the idea of parenthood with disabilities can be broken
down into five main common myths 82 that will be hereby refuted.
A. Dependency
There is a tendency to see people with disabilities, and disabled women in particular,
as helpless, passive, and entirely dependent on others to perform everyday tasks. Thus, as
someone who needs "to be taken care of," a disabled woman is not expected to be able to
"take care" of a child.83 It is true that mothers with disabilities admitted their need to balance
their determination to be independent with the need to accept some help and be somewhat
dependent. 84 Nevertheless, dependency is a feature that plays into the life experience of
most people, and non-disabled parents often require some kind of assistance when caring
80 See generally MARY Jo DEEGAN & NANCY A. BROOKS, WOMEN AND DISABILITY: THE DOUBLE HANDICAP
(1985); William John Hanna & Betsy Rogovsky, Women with Disabilities: Two Handicaps Plus, 6 DISABILITY,
HANDICAP & Soc'Y 49 (1991); Lisa Schur, Contending with the "Double Handicap," 25 WOMEN & POL. 31
(2003). The idea of double discrimination was recognized by the UN in the CRPD. See Coffey, supra note 18,
at 266; Women and Girls with Disabilities, U.N ENABLE, http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=1514
[http://penna.cc/JUW6-FDT4] (last accessed June 25, 2015).
81 As articulated by Linda Long-Bellil: "Mothers with disabilities are left to avail themselves of broader
social policies that affect people with disabilities and mothers as separate categories, but rarely address their
needs as a discrete group." See Linda Long-Bellil, Public Policy andMothers with Disabilities, in TAKING CARE:
LESSONS FROM MOTHERS WITH DISABILITIES 101, 101 (Mary Grimley Mason & Linda Long-Bellil eds., 2012).
82 In their 1981 article, Shaul, Dowling, and Laden addressed similar myths regarding mothers with
disabilities. It seems that not much has changed in almost thirty-five years with regard to the social stigma
carried towards this group. See Susan Shaul, Pamela Dowling & Bernice F. Laden, Like Other Women:
Perspective ofMothers with Physical Disabilities, 8 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 364, 365 (1981).
83 HEATHER KUTTAI, MATERNITY ROLLS: PREGNANCY, CHILDBIRTH AND DISABILITY 76 (2010); Lars Grue &
Kristin Taftord Loerum, 'Doing Motherhood': Some Experiences of Mothers with Physical Disabilities, 17
DISABILITY & Soc'Y 671, 673 (2010); Carol Thomas, The Baby and the Bath Water: Disabled Women and
Motherhood in Social Context, 19 Soc. HEALTH & ILLNESS 622, 639 (1997).
84 Mary Grimley Mason & Linda Long-Bellil, Having a Child: From the Decision through the Postpartum
Experience, TAKING CARE, supra note 81, at 1, 2 [hereinafter Grimley Mason & Long-Bellil, Having a Child];
Carnit Noa-Shpigelman, How to Support the Needs ofMothers with Physical Disabilities?, 2014 DISABILITY
& REHABILITATION 1, 3, 6.
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for their children, and rightfully so.85 The notion of interdependence in Disability Studies
embraces this idea of mutual dependency and stresses the need for communal support.8 6
Integrating the universal need for assistance as part of every human experience will help
in the process of countering the shaming and devaluation of those in need of some help
or care and will promote a better, more tolerant society, one that accepts human diversity
and accommodates it.87 Interdependence can therefore be a key concept in challenging the
stigma about the "ultimate dependency" of disabled parents.
B. Disability as Asexuality
Many people regard people with disabilities as asexual,88 a notion that translates into
seeing disabled women as incapable of conceiving and carrying a child.89 This myth seems
to be tied to sexual morality issues, frequently referred to as "family values" arguments,
that are specifically dominant in court decisions, elections, and decision-making processes
regarding policies within American society,9 ° but also exists in other societies as well. In
reality, people with disabilities, like most humans, have sexual urges. They are sexual
beings who have intimate, loving relationships just like non-disabled people.91
85 Thomas, supra note 83, at 639.
86 AL CONDELUCI, INTERDEPENDENCE: THE ROUTE TO COMMUNITY 90 (2d ed. 1995); Terry Beth Miller, Stalking
Grendel Mother: Biomedicine and the Disciplining of the Deviant Body, in DISABILITY & MOTHERING: LIMINAL
SPACES OF EMBODIED KNOWLEDGE 49, 61 (Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson & Jen Cellio eds., 2011).
87 Rosemane Garland-Thomson, Integrating Disability, Transforming Feminist Theory, in THE DISABILITY
STUD. READER, supra note 69, at 353, 363-64; Glen W. White, Jamie Lloyd Simpson, Chiaki Gonda, Craig
Ravesloot & Zach Coble, Moving from Independence to Interdependence: A Conceptual Model for Better
Understanding Community Participation of Centersfor Independent Living Consumers, 20 J. DISABILITY POL'Y
STUD. 233, 234 (2010).
88 Elizabeth F. Emens, Compulsory Sexuality, 66 STAN. L. REv. 303, 337 (2014); Michael L. Perlin,
Hospitalized Patients and the Right to Sexual Interaction: Beyond the Last Frontier?, 20 N.YU. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 517, 537 (1994); Tom Shakespeare, Disabled Sexuality: Towards Rights and Recognition, 18
SEXUALITY & DISABILITY 159, 160 (2000); Winiviere Sy, The Right of Institutionalized Disabled Patients to
Engage in Consensual SexualActivity, 23 WHITTIER L. REv. 545, 549 (2001).
89 Grimley Mason & Long-Bellil, Having a Child, supra note 84, at 9; Corbett Joan O'Toole, Sex, Disability
AndMotherhood: Access To Sexuality For DisabledMothers, 22 DISABILITY STUD. Q. 81, 87-89 (2002).
90 Perlin, supra note 88, at 517.
91 TOM SHAKESPEARE, DISABILITY RIGHTS AND WRONGS 168 (2006).
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C. Passing on the Disability
Disability is most often believed to be contagious or passed on genetically. Therefore
parents with disabilities have a greater chance to be "at risk" of having disabled offspring.9 2
However, counter to public perception, only a relatively small percentage of disabilities are
genetically based.93 Nowadays, most prospective parents encounter some type of genetic
counseling outlining the option for termination of the pregnancy if the fetus is likely to
have congenital impairments. For prospective parents with disabilities, this encounter
is obviously a much more charged one because it holds messages directly connected to
their self-perception.94 The Disability Studies critique of prenatal testing emphasizes the
problematic messages conveyed in many cases where parents are advised to terminate
the pregnancy including ideas that life with a disability is not worth living, that families
and society are better off having no disabled members, or that parental love is dependent
on the child's health and abilities.95 Disability rights advocates embrace the principle of a
choice given to the parents after doctors lay out all the options for them in a way that does
not paternalistically dismiss the possibility of having a disabled child.96 This proposal,
however, is not perfect and, as some critics point out, there are disparities in the way such
a "choice" is presented to disadvantaged communities such as poor people and people with
disabilities, 9 7 two categories that are closely connected.98
92 ROCKING THE CRADLE, supra note 50, at 213-16; Trina Balanoff & Matthew Wappett, Developmental
Denial: How the Attitudes ofParents and Professionals Shape Sexuality Education for Youth with Intellectual
Disabilities, in YOUTH: RESPONDING TO LIvES-AN INTERNATIONAL READER 259, 272 (Andrew Azzopardi ed.,
2013).
93 Shaul et al., supra note 82, at 365.
94 Thomas, supra note 83, at 627.
95 Ruth Hubbard, Abortion & Disability: Who Should and Should Not Inhabit the World, in THE DISABILITY
STUD. READER, supra note 69, at 107, 114-15; Sagit Mor, The Dialectics of Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth
Claims in Israel: a Disability Critique, 63 STUD. IN LAW, POLITICS & Soc'Y 113, 120 (Austin Sarat ed., 2014);
Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch, The Disability Rights Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing Reflections and
Recommendations, 29 HASTINGS CTR. REPORT 1, 2-3 (1999).
96 BAGENSTOS, supra note 71, at 95. For an alternative, feminist disability studies-inspired model for
enabling choice when it comes to reproductive rights, see Marsha Saxton, Disability Rights and Selective
Abortion, in THE DISABILITY STUD. READER, supra note 69, at 120, 129-31.
97 MICHAEL J. SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION 78 (2007); Cynthia Lewiecki-Wilson, Uneasy Subjects:
Disability, Feminism and Abortion, in DISABILITY & MOTHERING: LIMINAL SPACES OF EMBODIED KNOWLEDGE,
supra note 86, at 63, 75.
98 For the historic connection between poverty and disability, see, e.g., ROCKING THE CRADLE, supra note
30.1
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
Parents with disabilities have been found to be more open to the idea of having a child
with disabilities.99 In fact, two expecting parents of short stature (dwarfism) documented
in a qualitative study were "[f]ar from being worried or anxious about having a child
inherit their disability, they actually looked forward to sharing their experiences and
knowledge.""1 ' This is especially true for specific groups within the disability community
who view themselves as having a distinct cultural identity that is different from the
common social identity developed by the disability rights movement that relies on the
Social Model. 1 ' Such notable groups are the neurodiverse community (which is comprised
of people who are on the autistic spectrum), 10 2 the Deaf community,103 and the community
of people of short stature as organized by a group called "Little People of America." 104 A
Disability Studies perspective pushes towards the idea of viewing disability as a legitimate
and natural variation of human diversity as opposed to a deviation from the norm and by
that challenges the concept of "normalcy." 105 This point of view will help legitimize the
idea of having children with disabilities and cherish them.
50, at 27; SUSAN M. SCHWEIK, THE UGLY LAWS: DISABILITY IN PUBLIC 16 (2009); Deborah L. Little, 'Sit Home
and Collect the Check': Race, Class and the Social Construction of Disability Identity, in DISABILITY AS A
FLUID STATE 183, 191 (Sharon Banartt ed., 2010); Sagit Mor, Disability and the Persistence of Poverty:
Reconstructing Disability Allowances, 6 Nw. J.L. & Soc. POL'Y 178, 184 (2011); Jennifer Pokempner &
Dorothy E. Roberts, Poverty, Welfare Reform, and the Meaning of Disability, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 425, 431-33
(2001); Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the Law of Welfare, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 809,
809 (1966).
99 Grimley Mason & Long-Bellil, Having a Child, supra note 84, at 6.
100 Grimley Mason & Long-Bellil, Having a Child, supra note 84, at 6.
101 BAGENSTOS, supra note 71, at 18; Charles E. Drum, Models andApproaches to Disability, in DISABILITY &
PUB. HEALTH 27, 36-37 (Charles E. Drum, Gloria L. Krahn & Hank Bersani, Jr. eds., 2009); Arlene S. Kanter,
The Law: What Disability Studies Got to Do With I or An Introduction to Disability Legal Studies, 42 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 403, 421-23 (2011); John Lawson, Disability as a Cultural Identity, 11 INT'L STUD. SOC.
EDUC. 203, 206 (2001); Tom Shakespeare, Still a Health Issue, 5 DISABILITY & HEALTH J. 129, 129 (2012).
102 ANDREW SOLOMON, FAR FROM THE TREE: PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 263 (2012);
see generally Joseph N. Straus, Autism as Culture, in THE DISABILITY STUD. READER, supra note 69, at 535-59.
103 BRENDA Jo BRUEGGEMANN, DEAF SUBJECTS: BETWEEN IDENTITIES AND PLACES 9 (2009); SOLOMON, supra
note 102, at 62; SUSAN WENDELL, THE REJECTED BODY: FEMINIST PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON DISABILITY 28-29
(1996); Harlan Lane, Construction of Deafness, in THE DISABILITY STUD. READER, supra note 69, at 77, 78.
104 SOLOMON, supra note 102, at 115.
105 MARTHA RUSSELL, BEYOND RAMPS: DISABILITYAT THE END OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 16-17 (1998); WENDELL,
supra note 103, at 74-84; Lennard J. Davis, Constructing Normalcy, in THE DISABILITY STUD. READER, Supra
note 69, at 3, 4.
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D. Disability as a Sad Miserable State
Non-disabled people often see disability as a tragic consequence and a dreary
existence-certainly not a state that enables or allows one to bring children into it. I"6
However, most people with disabilities live independently and have satisfying and happy
lives.10 7 There is an inherent dissonance between how society and its institutions, including
the legal system, see disability (an "outside view") and the way people living with
disabilities perceive it (an "inside view"). While those on the outside think of disability as
an "unhappy and needy place," the inside view simply looks at it as "a mundane feature
of a no-less-happy life, rendered inconvenient or disabling largely by interactions with
the surrounding environment, which legal accommodations alter in ways that sometimes
provide benefits to many."108 According to disabled mothers themselves, their disability has
some benefits. They believe it brings to the table something unique in their role as parents:
they are able to discuss things that other parents might not understand, give their children
emotional support and teach them to be more independent. 109 They also argue that their
children grow up to be more sensitive and sympathetic to other stigmatized individuals. 110
E. How Do They Actually Do It?
Laypeople sometimes have a hard time grasping how people with a physical, sensory,
or intellectual disability can rear a child, since they see mobility and IQ as essential
elements of taking care of children. The answer to this concern is found in the concepts of
106 Shaul et al., supra note 82, at 365.
107 In fact, empirical studies found that people with severe disabilities report high quality of life, findings that
were known as "the disability paradox," a phrase that emphasizes an "outside view" on disability. See Bernd
Fellinghauer, Jan D. Reinhardt, Gerold Stucki & Jerome Bickenbach, Explaining the Disability Paradox: a
Cross-SectionalAnalysis of the Swiss General Population, 12 BMC PUB. HEALTH 655, 656 (2012).
108 Elizabeth F Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. ILL. L. REv. 1383, 1386. A similar notion can be found
in a statement by Nancy Mairs, a writer who lives with MS. She writes that "[s]elf-pity is simply one of those
sentiments more likely to be projected onto one from the outside than generated within." NANCY MAIRS, WAIST-
HIGH IN THE WORLD: A LIFE AMONG THE NONDISABLED 32 (1996).
109 Grimley Mason & Long-Bellil, Having a Child, supra note 84, at 97; Ora Prilleltensky, My Child is Not
My Career: Mothers with Physical Disabilities and the Well-Being of Children, 19 DISABILITY & Soc'Y 209, 217
(2004); Shaul et al., supra note 82, at 371.
110 Carolyn Gutman, The Challenges and Rewards of Parenthood: Experiences of Disabled Parents in
Israel, 27 DISABILITY STUD. Q. (2007), http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/46/46 [http://penna.cc/QZ9C-MFM6];
Shaul et al., supra note 82, at 371.
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assistive technology, personal assistance, and accommodations. 111 Early research showed
that disabled parents used to improvise and create for themselves devices that would help
them take care of their children. 112 Nowadays, adaptive equipment, such as changing tables
that allow wheelchairs to roll beneath them, and adapted services, such as special education
classes for parents with developmental disabilities, are more attainable.113 In California,
for example, Adapted Baby Care is covered by the state means test insurance program,
Medi-Cal. 114 Those accommodations are crucial when assessing the parenting skills of
parents,115 much like in the case of assessing the ability of an employee to perform the job
in the hiring process (as required by the ADA). 116 Unfortunately, many parents who are
involved with custody cases have not previously benefited from such resources because of
lack of means and community support. 117
Research has shown that most of the time when people with disabilities announce
their desire to become parents or that they were already expecting a child, they encounter
negative attitudes not only from society at large but also from members of their close
family,118 members of the medical profession,119 professionals working on custody cases
111 Long-Bellil, supra note 81, at 107-09.
112 Shaul et al., supra note 82, at 368.
113 Callow et al., supra note 63, at 19.
114 CAL. WELF & INST. CODE §§ 14132, 14059 (1937).
115 ROCKING THE CRADLE, supra note 50, at 174; Callow et al., supra note 63, at 19, 30-31. See also
Seth Freed Wessler, Should a Mental Illness Mean You Lose Your Child?, PROPUBLICA (May 30, 2014),
http://www.propublica.org/article/should-a-mental-illness-mean-you-lose-your-kid [http ://perna.cc/5 H9Z-
PM85] ("[P]arents are often evaluated without a real analysis of their supports, of the life they actually
live' ..... [A]s a result, 'the diagnosis starts to speak louder than real life."').
116 Section 12112(a) of the ADA determines that failing to accommodate a person with regard to the job
application and the hiring process is considered discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (1990).
117 ROCKING THE CRADLE, supra note 50, at 172-73.
118 Grimley Mason & Long-Bellil, Having a Child, supra note 84, at 9.
119 KUTTAI, supra note 83, at 106-07; Grimley Mason & Long-Bellil, Having a Child, supra note 84, at 9;
Ella Callow, DisabledMothers: Misadventures & Motherhood in the American Courts, in DISABLED MOTHERS:
STORIES AND SCHOLARSHIP BY AND ABOUT MOTHERS WITH DISABILITIES 277, 282 (Gloria Filax & Dena Taylor eds.,
2014); Long-Bellil, supra note 81, at 105.
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(mostly the welfare system), 120 as well as lawyers and the courts themselves. 121 None of
the abovementioned seem to be aware of the solutions and the progresses made over the
years and still hold on to the prejudice, biases, and myths against the idea of parenthood
with disabilities.
It also has been argued that for many years, discussions about women with
disabilities as mothers were absent from scholarship and academic discourse. 122 Research
on women's embodied experiences, including pregnancy, has been mostly discussed by
feminist scholars, but for many years feminist research has ignored the experiences and
"body knowledge" 123 of women and mothers with disabilities. 124 This is changing over
time as a close alliance between Disability Studies and Feminist Studies has emerged. 125
This alliance can be traced to second-wave feminism, which embraced a "plurality of
differences" into this scholarship 126 and is interconnected with the broad need to end
all inequalities in the world associated with third-wave feminism. 127 The main reason
for this connection has to do with the fact that feminist thinkers were the ones to note
the most radical issues about cultural attitudes to the body that are common for the
mistreatment of women as well as people with disabilities. 128 As a consequence, starting
120 ROCKING THE CRADLE, supra note 50, at 90-91.
121 Callow et al., supra note 63, at 18; Callow, supra note 119, at 287, 290.
122 Adrienne Asch, Critical Race Theory, Feminism, and Disability: Reflections on Social Justice and
Personal Identity, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 418 (2001).
123 Susan Van Den Tillaart, Donna Kurtz & Penny Cash, Powerlessness, MarginalizedIdentity, and Silencing
of Health Concerns: Voiced Realities of Women Living with a Mental Health Diagnosis, 108 INT'L J. MENTAL
HEALTH NURSING 153, 157 (2009).
124 KUTTAI, supra note 83, at 61; Carol J. Gill, The Last Sisters: Health Issues of Women with Disabilities,
in WOMEN'S HEALTH: COMPLEXITIES AND DIFFERENCES 96, 97-98 (Sheryl Burt Ruzek, Virgina L. Olesen & Adele
E. Clarke eds., 1997).
125 Mark Sherry, Overlaps and Contradictions Between Queer Theory and Disability Studies, 19 DISABILITY
& Soc'Y 769, 776 (2004).
126 Marjorie Pryce, Critical Interdisciplinary, Women s Studies, and Cross-Cultural Insight, 10 NAT'L
WOMEN'S STUD. Ass'N J. 1, 1 (1998).
127 RORY DICKER, A HISTORY OF U.S. FEMINISMS 130 (2008).
128 Susan Wendell, Toward a Feminist Theory ofDisability, in THE DISABILITY STUD. READER, supra note 69,
at 336-37; see also Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Feminist Disability Studies, 30 SIGNS: J. WOMEN IN CULTURE
& Soc'Y 1557, 1558-59 (2005). For a discussion on the alliance between feminist legal scholars and disability
rights scholars in the context of labor law, see Michelle A. Travis, Disabling the Gender Pay Gap: Lessonsfrom
30.1
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF GENDER AND LAW
in the 1990s, memoirs and complete volumes of scholarship about disabled mothers have
started to surface. 129
Years later, the concept of disabled motherhood has also manifested itself into an
iconic visual image that was displayed in the public sphere. In 2005, an eleven-foot-tall
statue by the British artist Marc Quinn depicting seven-month-pregnant Alison Lapper, a
visual artist herself who was born without arms and with shorter legs, was displayed in
Trafalgar Square in London.13 In 2012, a much larger inflatable replica was displayed in
the opening ceremony of the London Paralympic Games."' Lapper, who has become an
international symbol of disabled motherhood was also depicted, alongside her son Parys, in
the BBC documentary series "Child of Our Time," which follows twenty-five young British
children from different backgrounds born around the millennium.132 In a recent interview,
Lapper discussed the struggles she still has to deal with on an every day basis being a single
disabled mother. She talks about the looks she gets from strangers, the lack of awareness
of health professionals, and her experiences with personal assistants she has hired over
the years (to whom she refers as "my arms"). She also stresses the fear of social services
that might take her child away at any moment if she makes even the smallest mistake. 133
These struggles, specifically the fear of losing custody of the child due to authorities'
suspicions, seem to exist across western societies and were found to be experienced by
the SocialModel ofDisability, 91 DENVER U. L. REV. 893, 901-02 (2014).
129 For an incomplete list of scholarship and memoirs see GLORIA FILAX & DENA TAYLOR, supra note 119;
ANNE FINGER, PAST DUE: A STORY OF DISABILITY, PREGNANCY AND BIRTH (1990); DENISE SHERER JACOBSON, THE
QUESTION OF DAVID: A DISABLED MOTHER'S JOURNEY THROUGH ADOPTION, FAMILY AND LIFE (1999); KUTTAI, supra
note 83; LEWIECKI-WILSON & CELLIO, supra note 86; GWYNNYTH LLEWELLYN, RANNVEIG TRAUSTADOTTIR, DAVID
McCoNNELL & HANNA BJORG SIGURJONSDOTT, PARENTS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: PAST, PRESENT AND
FUTURES (2010); MICHELE WATES & ROWEN JADE, BIGGER THAN THE SKY: DISABLED WOMEN ON PARENTING (1999);
Grimley Mason & Long-Bellil, supra note 84.
130 Ann Millett-Gallant, Sculpting Body Ideals: Alison Lapper Pregnant and the Public Display ofDisability,
in THE DISABILITY STUD. READER, supra note 69, at 476.
131 Emine Saner, Alison Lapper: 'Disabled People are Looked at as a Drain on Society, and I'm Certainly
Not That,' GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2014/aug/02/alison-lapper-
disabled-people-drain-on-society [http://penna.cc/44TF-7FLE].
132 Melissa Thompson, 'He sulky and Xbox-obsessed and I'm so relieved': Paralympics Icon Alison
Lapper Happy Her Son is Typical Teenager, DAILY MIRROR (Feb. 28, 2013), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/
real-life-stories/alison-lapper-happy-son-parys- 1734221 [http://perna.cc/GPV3-AFUF].
133 Saner, supra note 131.
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disabled mothers in the United States,134 Canada,135 Norway,13 6 Denmark,137 England,138
Australia,139 and Israel. 140
Therefore it seems that there is still a long way to go until the full acceptance and
inclusion of disabled motherhood and parenthood in society. The case of Ora Mor Yosef
an Israeli woman living with muscular dystrophy, whose lifelong dream of becoming a
mother came to an end before it even began highlights the role legal institutions play in
subordinating and excluding the notion of parenthood for people with disabilities.
134 ROCKING THE CRADLE, supra note 50, at 99; Callow, supra note 119, at 281-83.
135 Marjorie Aunos, Maurice Feldman & Georgette Goupil, Mothering with Intellectual Disabilities:
Relationship Between Social Support, Health and Well-Being, Parenting and Child Behaviour Outcomes, 21 J.
APPLIED RES. INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES 320, 324 (2008) (finding mothers reporting stressful events involving
the Youth Protection Agency).
136 Grue & Tafjord Lwrum, supra note 83, at 678.
137 Jytte Faureholm, Children and their Life Experiences, in PARENTS WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES: PAST,
PRESENT AND FUTURES, supra note 129, at 63, 71.
138 Thomas, supra note 83, at 633.
139 Carolyn Frohmader, Helen Meekosha & Karen Soldatic, Unruly Mothers or Unruly Practices? Disabled
Mothers Surviving Oppression State Practices in Australia, in DISABLED MOTHERS: STORIES AND SCHOLARSHIP BY
AND ABOUT MOTHERS WITH DISABILITIES, supra note 119, at 295, 300.
140 As indicated in a recent qualitative study done on disabled mothers in Israel, it was found that "the
mothers preferred to ask for help from close family members ... rather than government services (e.g., social
welfare services)." Those mothers also "felt like they had to prove that they are not disabled and can fulfill
the traditional mothering role .... Some of them even described it a super-mom identity[.]" Noa-Shpigelman,
supra note 84, at 3-4. An earlier qualitative research done with Israeli visually impaired mothers showcased an
experience by a young mother who
had faced the quizzical comments from the community nurse at the baby clinic during her
pregnancy and then the insensitive behavior of the nursing staff and social workers at the
hospital following the birth: within half an hour of giving birth she was "interrogated"
about her abilities to function as a mother. Moreover, she was not allowed to hold or feed
the baby or feed the baby if she was alone in her room.
Gutman, supra note 110. Recently, the Tel Aviv District Court has decided that a baby born to a woman with
mental disabilities and was given to a foster care family at birth will be adopted by that family. The biological
mother who is living in an institution and had no support from her family in raising the baby was found to be an
unfit parent. She was never allowed to actually see the baby; however, the court has decided to give her access
to photos and video of the baby. See File No. 3-14 DC (TA), Anonymous v. Att'y Gen. of Israel (Feb. 9, 2015),
Nevo Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
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III. The Case of Ora Mor Yosef
Ora Mor Yosef, a Jewish-Israeli woman who is in now her late forties, has been
living with muscular dystrophy all her life. She resides independently in southern Israel
alongside her large, supportive, and loving family and uses personal assistance. Like
many other women with disabilities, Ora has always wanted to become a mother. 141 Due
to her impairment, Ora could not bear a pregnancy and so she needed to use third-party
reproduction methods which, as mentioned, are highly restricted in Israel. Therefore, she
had to seek a doctor who would be willing to extract eggs from her ovaries so that she
could later use them for IVF treatments. After getting rejected by many doctors because
of her disability, her age (Ora was in her early forties then), and the possibility of medical
hazards, Ora finally found a doctor who was willing to do the procedure. Luckily, three
of Ora's eggs were successfully inseminated through IVF with the sperm of her then-
partner, and three embryos were then created and frozen. Despite the fact that Ora passed
the required parental efficacy evaluations done by the state, when she and her then-partner
wanted to apply to go through a surrogacy process in Israel, they were rejected because
they were not legally married.
After the couple broke up, the now-single Ora did not want to give up on her dream.
For altruistic reasons, a relative volunteered to serve as her surrogate. 142 The two traveled
to the United States on a lawful "reproductive tour" to try and insert the embryos in the
surrogate's uterus. Unfortunately, the treatment did not succeed and a pregnancy did not
develop.
At that point, Ora's dream was about to collapse, but her desire to have a child, boosted
by the socio-cultural realties of her society and the support of her family, was so great she
was determined to fulfill it. Since Ora is not considered a candidate for adoption in Israel,
she got a sperm donation from an acquaintance (who promised to give up his parental
rights), and an anonymous egg donation. She decided to try one more time to bring a child
141 Grimley Mason & Long-Bellil, Having a Child, supra note 84, at 1, 11. As Heather Kuttai, a paraplegic
mother, puts it, "[w]hen pregnant, I was often not the 'Other' for probably the first time in my life[.]" KUTTAI,
supra note 83, at 71.
142 The altruistic agenda behind the surrogacy in this case makes it less vulnerable to feminist critique and
ethical concerns, see Brenda M. Baker, A Casefor Permitting Altruistic Surrogacy, 11 HYPATIA 34, 42 (1996).
Nevertheless, some scholars who object to the idea of surrogacy altogether raised the question of whether an
altruistic surrogate who is a friend or relative can really "provide a genuine informed consent." See, e.g., M.
M. Tieu, Altruistic Surrogacy: The Necessary Objectification of Surrogate Mothers, 35 J. MED. ETHIcs 171,
171 (2009).
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into the world. This time, Ora and the surrogate traveled to India where the IVF took place,
and the embryo was successfully inseminated. Ora and the pregnant surrogate went back
to Israel after spending ten days in India.
Upon their arrival, Ora headed to the formal state officials to register as the baby's
mother before the birth. Ora was notified that she could not be registered as the parent
because there was not genetic or gestational connection between her and the child. When
the surrogate was nine months pregnant, Ora had filed for a declaratory judgment decree
with the family court. A month later, a baby girl was born, and despite judicial efforts to
declare Ora as her temporary guardian, the baby was put in foster care. It was held that the
child would remain in foster care, and would not be put up for permanent adoption until a
decision on Ora's request to declare herself as the legal parent of the baby would be made.
She has never been allowed to see the baby.
The Ora Mor Yosef case is a challenging one. It involves extremely delicate
circumstances of a single, disabled woman whose desire to have a baby drove her to
"coordinate" one for herself, using the help of third-parties who all (excluding the egg
donor, remained anonymous) had consented to giving the baby to Ora to raise. This story
raises moral and ethical questions about who can be considered a parent; it is undisputable
that Ora does not have a biological-genetic or gestational connection to the girl but she, as
someone who initiated her existence and went to great lengths in order to bring her into
the world, claims to have a profound emotional connection to her and sees herself as her
mother. From Ora's perspective, giving the baby to a foster family who does not bear any
biological connection to her either is absurd. This case demonstrates how far some people
with disabilities are willing to go in order to become parents and the consequences of not
having a clear policy on the matter that keeps pace with both technological developments
and cultural-societal attitudes.
In June 2013, the family court denied Ora's petition for declaratory judgment. 143 The
court stated that Israeli law, not Indian law, which would have permitted the procedure and
declared Ora as the baby's mother, governed. 144 Israeli law does not recognize a private
contractual agreement to have a baby without state regulation of the process. 145 The court
has specifically stated that the main obstacle to the recognition of parental status in this
143 File No. 50399-12-12 Family Court (BS), M.Y v. Anonymous (June 20, 2013), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
144 Id. at article 38.
145 Id. at articles 30-32.
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case is the lack of genetic connection between Ora and the baby. Under current Israeli law,
the declaration of such status is impossible from a legal standpoint. 146 Missing from the
family court decision was any attention to the fact that Ora is a woman with disabilities or
any attention to the lack of options with regard to motherhood, available to Israeli women
in her position.
Ora appealed this decision. Seven months after the family court decision, in January
2014, after requests for expedition were disregarded, a decision rejecting the appeal was
given in the district court. 147 The appellate court agreed with the family court's decision to
apply Israeli law (as opposed to the Indian law) and with the family's court's application
of the requirement to have a genetic-biological connection in order to establish parental
status. 148 The appellate court also mentioned some of the dangers in opening up the
floodgates to "parenthood by contract" and warned against the dangers of allowing people to
make deals for creating children. 149 The court briefly dismissed Ora's claim about disability
discrimination by saying that, because the requirement for genetic connection is prominent
with other groups including single mothers, LGBTQ individuals, etc., one cannot stress
that disabled people are specifically being discriminated against on the matter. 150 Therefore,
it should be an issue for the legislature to amend and the court has no power to guarantee a
judgment declaring Ora as the baby's parent.151
Ora did not give up and submitted a request to appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court.
Her request was granted and a hearing before an extended panel of seven justices was
conducted in July 2014 (nearly a year after the first decision of the family court). This
time Ora got the support of the Disability Rights Clinic of Bar-Ilan University's Faculty of
Law, which joined the proceeding as an amicus curiae in an attempt to bring the disability
issue to the forefront of the case. Shortly after the hearing, the Supreme Court gave a short
unanimous decision to reject the appeal. Because of the urgent nature of the case, this
decision was given without reasoning. The Supreme Court stated it will give the reasoning
146 Id. at articles 48-50.
147 File No. 59993-07-13 DC (BS), Anonymous v. Anonymous (Jan. 22, 2013), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) [hereinafter "the District Court decision"].
148 Id. at articles 17-18.
149 Id. at articles 16, 18.
150 Id. at article 20.
151 Id. at articles 19, 22.
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at a later stage.152 At the hearing itself, Ora's attorneys requested that, if the court decides
not to declare her as the baby's mother, she would at least get some say or special status in
the adoption processes, which has not yet begun. When the Justices asked the government
lawyers for their opinion, they argued that such special treatment was unacceptable because
it would send the wrong message about the legality of the actions taken by Ora, which, they
claimed, stand in contrast to public policy and open the door to such potential phenomenon
as child trafficking. Therefore, the Supreme Court said that it would not decide on the
question of giving special status to Ora in the adoption proceeding, and stated it would
leave the decision to the family court if Ora submitted a later request regarding this issue.153
On April 1, 2015, the Israeli Supreme Court gave its reasoning for its decision in the
case. 1 54 All the justices accepted the findings of the district and family courts on the matter.
Out of the seven justices who gave their reasoning, only one justice, Justice Hanan Melcer,
discussed the issue of Ora's disability in detail and mentioned the Equal Rights for People
with Disabilities Law, as well as Article 23 to the UN CRPD. Justice Melcer pointed out the
"normative void" that currently exists in Israeli law with regard to ensuring reproductive
rights for people with disabilities and called for the legislature to intervene and enact laws
and create policies in order to fill it.155 Former Chief Justice Asher Grunis and Justice
Neal Handel both explicitly said that this is an issue for the legislature, and that with all
sympathy to Ora's unique situation, the court's hands in the current normative and legal
landscape were tied. 156
IV. What Did the Courts Miss? A Disability Legal Studies Analysis
The stated reasoning in the Ora Mor Yosef decisions focused on the need for a genetic-
biological connection between a prospective parent and a baby in order to declare a
parental status. The rationale given by the courts was concern about public policy drawn
from a fear of a dystopian scenario where people are bringing children who have no
152 File No. 11184/14 CA, Anonymous v. Ministry of Soc. Affairs & Soc. Servs. (July 13, 2014), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
153 Id.
154 File No. 11184/14 CA, Anonymous v. Ministry of Soc. Affairs & Soc. Servs. (Apr. 1, 2015), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.) [hereinafter "the Supreme Court decision"].
155 Article 6 to Justice Melcer's opinion in the Supreme Court decision, id.
156 Id. at4-5,26.
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clear roots and identity into the world for all sorts of illegal, immoral and certainly
nerve-wracking goals. 15 7
As mentioned, jurisdictions in the United States.also tend to see great importance in the
genetic connection when deciding on matters of custody and parenthood.158 For example, the
New Jersey Supreme Court decided against declaring a woman to be the mother of a child
born by a surrogate, using an egg that was not hers, because of the lack of genetic connection,
unless she would legally adopt the child. 159 In that case, however, the consequences of the
decision were much less tragic than in Ora's because the woman had raised the child since
birth with her husband (the baby was three years old when the court decision was made), and
the baby was not taken away from them. It also should be noted that the New Jersey court was
divided on the issue (three to three), and, because of the deadlock, the appellate court ruling
was affirmed. 160 Interestingly, the case has been criticized for not implementing a gender-
neutral policy, as contrastingly infertile men are immediately considered fathers when a
baby is conceived using another man's sperm. 161 This case, therefore, resembles another
Israeli Supreme Court ruling, which guarantees the spouse in Israeli same-sex couples who
does not hold a genetic connection to a baby born from inter-country surrogacy immediate
recognition as the other parent (and thus makes similar adoption proceedings imposed by
157 See the District Court decision, supra note 147, at article 16; the Supreme Court decision, supra note 154
at articles 21 and 25 to Justice Hendel's opinion, article 4 to Chief Justice Miriam Naor's opinion, and article
2 to Justice Esther Hayut opinion. For the distinction between "baby selling" and surrogacy, see Coffey, supra
note 18, at 289-90.
158 Dashiell, supra note 53, at 856. An exception to the rule is the model of "Parenthood by Intent" that was
recognized by the 1998 decision by the California Court of Appeals involving Luanne and John Buzzanca, a
married couple who contracted with a surrogate to carry an embryo that had no genetic connection to neither
of them (while the identities of both the sperm and egg donors were unknown). After the couple separated, the
woman petitioned to get custody of the baby and to declare her ex-husband as the lawful father in order to get
child support, to the latter's objection. The Court of Appeal has recognized the couple as the parents, basing its
decision on the couple's intention of having the baby and accepting a reasoning similar to that made by Ora:
"Let us get right to the point: Jaycee [the baby] never would have been born had not Luanne and John both
agreed to have a fertilized egg implemented in a surrogate." See Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 61 Cal. App. 4th 1410,
1412 (1998). For further discussion of the case, see, e.g., Halperin-Kaddari, supra note 30, at 321-22; Richard
F Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Intention: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage,
53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 607-10 (2002).
159 In re T.J.S., 16A.3d 386, 395-97 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
160 In re T.J.S., 54A.3d263 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2012).
161 Dashiell, supra note 53, at 880.
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the New Jersey court unnecessary in Israel).162 Ora's case, however, presents unique and
unprecedented circumstances that might have tipped the scales in another direction.
Although the concerns about parenthood by contract can be understood and are worthy
of a broader and deeper discussion as well as the development of legislative means to
prevent them from occurring, I would argue that they do not really manifest themselves in
the special and specific circumstances of this case. I would also argue that the courts (with
the exception of Justice Melcer's opinion) did not address the starting point for this story-
and that is the notion of accessibility and discrimination against people with disabilities
who do not hold access to reproductive policies that fit their needs. It seems that the courts
were challenged by the idea of a disabled, single woman who wanted to become a mother
and instead of evaluating her capability to raise and care for the baby, they chose the easy
way out by dismissing her claim, relying on hypothetical concerns about possible child
abuse, which did not exist in Ora's case. The courts did not bear in mind that the current
Israeli legal system is designed in such a way that people like Ora cannot have children
and, thus, are being left out of the 'child centric' society they were born into. Such a
problematic lack of access needs to be addressed by the courts, regardless of whether it
hurts only people with disabilities or other groups as well.
The notion of accessibility is prominent when discussing disability-related issues,
and it has broader political implications than traditionally thought of the issue, such as
providing ramps in the entrance to public buildings. Disability Studies scholars argue
that participation in physical, social, and political systems was initially designed with
only the needs of able-bodied persons in mind. 163 That design theory excludes people
with disabilities from the public sphere as well as most areas of life, including the labor
market and the mainstream education system. 164 Accessibility calls for removing social and
physical barriers and allowing people with disabilities to be included in all areas of life. As
articulated in Article 9 of the UN CRPD:
162 File No. 11184/14 HCJ, Mainat v. Ministry of Interior (Jan. 28, 2014), Nevo Legal Database (by
subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
163 Rob Imrie, Oppression, Disability and Access in the Built Environment, in DISABILITY READER: SOCIAL
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVES 129, 133 (Tom Shakespeare ed., 1998); Sally S. Scott, Joan M. McGuire & Teresa E.
Foley, Universal Design for Instruction: A Framework for Anticipating and Responding to Disability and
Other Diverse Learning Needs in the College Classroom, 36 EQUITY & EXCELLENCE IN EDUC. 40, 41 (2003).
164 Armantine M. Smith, Persons with Disabilities as a Social and Economic Underclass, 12 KAN. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 13, 21 (2002-2003).
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To enable persons with disabilities to live independently and participate
fully in all aspects of life, States Parties shall take appropriate measures
to ensure to persons with disabilities access, on an equal basis with
others, to the physical environment, to transportation, to information and
communications ... and to other facilities and services open or provided
to the public .... These measures, which shall include the identification
and elimination of obstacles and barriers to accessibility.165
With regard to issues of custody, Article 9 should be read together with Article 23
of the UN CRPD, which requires party states to eliminate discrimination against people
with disabilities with regard to parenting and raising a family. 166 As mentioned by Justice
Melcer, since Israel has signed and ratified the convention, 167 there is a need for the Israeli
legislature to fill in the current "normative void." 168 Then again, although this declaration
by Justice Melcer is worthy of esteem, and one could hope it will bring some future policy
change, it does not manifest itself in a way that would allow Ora to have a relationship with
the baby since it can only be considered as obiter dictum.
The courts' focus on the lack of a genetic connection served as a reason for not allowing
Ora the baby she desperately struggled to have. The underlying assumption of the Israeli
(and some American) courts is that the biological connection predicts the child's welfare,
but this is not necessarily the case, especially when the parental skills of the prospective
non-biological parent are assessed (as in adoption processes and also in Ora's case). 169 As
articulated by Dorothy E. Roberts, in a different context, it seems that "the genetic tie is
inherently paradoxical. It is at once a means of connection and a means of separation. It
links individuals together while it preserves social boundaries."' 170
Ironically, the end result in Ora's case was that the baby was given to others who do
not have a genetic connection to her either, instead of to Ora who, as the district court
165 See Art. 9 to the UN CRPD, supra note 6 (emphasis added); Coffey, supra note 18, at 268-70.
166 See Art. 23 to the UN CRPD, supra note 6.
167 See supra note 5.
168 Articles 4-6 to Justice Melcer's opinion in the Supreme Court decision, supra note 154.
169 Asch, supra note 35, at 130; Abigail Lauren Perdue, For Love or Money: An Analysis of the Contractual
Regulation ofReproductive Surrogacy, 27 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 279, 310 (2011).
170 Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CH. L. REv. 209, 211 (1995).
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clearly stated, is a fit parent who passed the official parental efficacy evaluations. 171 This
decision, whether intentionally or not, conveys the message that the state focused its power
on refusing to give the child to a disabled woman and preferred having it be raised by other,
non-disabled parents.
In a way, the court's decision can be seen as a warning sign and punishment of Ora
for acting in ways that do not align with the current legal system (although one could
argue that since the issue of surrogacy outside the country is not formally regulated in
Israeli legislation, Ora's move cannot be seen as illegal). The courts were concerned about
the possibility of people who would act in such borderline unlawful ways of bringing
babies into the world, then presenting the courts with afait accompli when asking courts to
recognize them as the parents. 172 Nevertheless, because the circumstances of this story are
more unique, in that Ora had tried every other way of having a child and her final choice
was her last resort, the courts should have ruled differently. Furthermore, I fail to see a
specific legal source that would authorize the government to take a baby away from its
parents, if it is believed that it was not conceived legally: as this is such a serious means of
punishment, it should be stated clearly in the criminal law.
Given the circumstances of this story, international law, and the broader message
the courts could have given regarding the participation and inclusion of people with
disabilities in Israeli society, I argue that the courts should either allow Ora to adopt the
baby, or in the alternative, come up with an arrangement that would have allowed her to
have a substantial connection to the child. By doing so, the court would have assuaged
the trauma caused to all parties, namely: Ora, the baby, the surrogate (who wanted Ora to
have the baby), and the foster family. This kind of solution would have also allowed the
baby to have a relationship not only with Ora, but also with the surrogate who carried her
(because of the familial relationship between Ora and the surrogate). This kind of
relationship would have strengthened the child's sense of belonging and identity and
therefore is recommended in the literature. 173 Instead of following either of these
prescriptions, some justices expressed hope that the family court that will discuss the future
adoption proceedings would reach "a concrete, pragmatic and just solution in the matter," 174
171 See the District Court decision, supra note 147, at article 21.
172 Article 5 to Justice Salim Joubran's opinion, in the Supreme Court decision, supra note 154.
173 Asch, supra note 35, at 132; Mary Lydon Shanley & Sujatha Jesudason, Surrogacy: Reinscribing or
Pluralizing Understandings of Family?, in FAMILiEs-BEYOND THE NUCLEAR IDEAL, supra note 35, at 110, 118.
174 Words of Justice Yoram Danziger in article 5 to his opinion in the Supreme Court decision, supra note
154. See also article 5 to Justice Naor's opinion, supra note 154.
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but refused to mandate any requirement that the family court give Ora some kind of special
status in further proceedings.
A decision given by the England and Wales Family Court in Leicester, given in October
2014, known as the case of "Baby H," represents an alternative way of handling a custody
case involving parents with disabilities. 175 In that case, a couple with intellectual disabilities
gave birth to a baby girl. After the social worker was not sure that the parents would be
able to care for the child, the baby was placed with a foster family that was known and
related to the parents, so that the parents would have some visitation rights until their
parental skills could be properly assessed. 176 After eighteen months, a positive assessment
of the parents' skills was given and Baby H. was returned to them.177 Nevertheless, the long
wait due to "poor practices admitted by the local [welfare] authority, ' 178 had an impact
on both the parents and the foster family. The court recognized this impact and awarded
them compensation for emotional distress. 179 In Ora's case, the long proceedings (lasting
much more than 18 months since the baby was born) and the fact that Ora had not seen the
baby (although unlike in the Baby H. case, she was never recognized as the parent) were
unrightfully ignored by the Israeli courts.18°
The relatively new field of Disability Legal Studies seeks to apply Disability Studies
perspectives to law and examines the role legal institutions play in the social construction
of disability.181 Looking at the Ora Mor Yosef case through the Disability Legal Studies
prism introduces new complexities in this challenging matter and shows it as a missed
opportunity in terms of making an important statement for disabled people in Israel and
beyond. In that respect, having only one justice (out of seven who adjudicated the case)
addressing the issue of disability is highly concerning.
175 Re H (A Child), [2014] EWFC (Fam) 38 (appeal taken from Gr. Brit).
176 Id. at articles 13-15, 17.
177 Id. at article 38.
178 Id. at article 45.
179 Id. at articles 40-46, 82-83.
180 Adjudication or investigation time is of essence in American cases as well and has a grave influence on
the chances of the parents ever getting custody of the child. See Picciuto, supra note 65.
181 Kanter, supra note 101, at 444; Sagit Mor, Between Charity, Welfare, and Warfare: A Disability Legal
Studies Analysis of Privilege and Neglect in Israeli Disability Policy, 18 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 63, 64 (2006).
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Ora's tragic story should be seen as a missed opportunity of recognizing the existence
and hardships of disabled mothers and make a difference for their benefit. Taking into
account the structural barriers within the legal system that stem from stigma and ignorance
in society about the topic, could have progressed the wellbeing of the parties to this story
as well as that of people with disabilities in general. This Article hopes to get this message
across to jurists, policy makers, legislators, scholars, and others who might be able to
guarantee similar cases in the future will not end in the same way.
V. Final Thoughts
After losing her custody battle, Ora and her sister have turned to the family court,
once again requesting that it allow the sister to adopt the baby so that Ora could have some
relationship with her. A decision has yet to be made on the matter.1 82
One small ray of light with regards to access to parenthood for people with disabilities
in Israel has shined in the midst of Ora's legal battle, although it did not seem to help her.
In December 2013, the family court in Haifa has guaranteed the request of a married man
with a mental disability (paranoid schizophrenia) to go through a state-funded surgical
sperm retrieval procedure in order to attempt to have a child through ART (court approval
is needed by law when involving persons who are under guardianship). Judge Esperanza
Alon approved the procedure after she was convinced that the man has the support of his
family and wife of eight years and by his desire to have a child. Judge Alon even went a
step further by recognizing the international status of the "right to parenthood."183 Although
this decision is a step forward in the recognition of people with disabilities' right to become
parents, this case deals with ART methods, which are known to be much more acceptable
in the Israeli context than third-party reproduction methods, it also involves a married man
who is not traditionally perceived to be the main caretaker for the child. One could only
guess what would have been the decision if a woman had been the disabled spouse in that
situation.
182 Ora has turned to social media in an attempt to raise awareness of her story as well as of other people
who lost custody of children to the Israeli welfare system. Unfortunately, it seems that her anger and frustration
have caused her to become less diplomatic and more aggressive, including personal attacks on government
social workers in social media posts. This behavior sends an unsettling message that might push the baby even
further away from her.
183 File No. 6036-10-08 Family Court (Hi), Anonymous v. Att'y Gen. of Israel (Dec. 29, 2013), Nevo Legal
Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
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